

Exclucentrism

Toward a Critical Theory of the Production of Peripheral Subjects

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I. Canonical Postulate

The name exclucentrism enters through the front door of a lineage with which it has scores to settle. The series of centrism diagnosed by the social sciences and philosophy over the course of the twentieth century, eurocentrism, ethnocentrism, androcentrism, phallogentrism, logocentrism, shares an operation that the critique itself has almost never been willing to name. Each designates a center by its content: Europe, the ethnos, the masculine, the logos. Yet none interrogates the apparatus that produces centers as such. For decades, critique contented itself with denouncing what stood in the middle, leaving intact the machinery that placed it there. This omission is not innocent. It is the condition that has allowed each dismantled centrism to be replaced by another without the ground ever shifting.

Exclucentrism does not name another content. It names that machinery. Its thesis is that no centrism is first European, or first masculine, and only afterwards exclusionary. It is exclu-centric before anything else. Its centrality is not contaminated by an outside; it constitutes itself by producing that outside, and in the same gesture it disauthorizes that outside as its own product. It fabricates the margin and simultaneously erases the traces of the fabrication. The margin is not what the center finds but what the center invents in order to be a center at all, and the proof of its success is that the margin reappears afterward as a natural datum, as an incapacity proper to the marginalized, as a historical accident without an author. Eurocentrism does not produce a non-European margin as a collateral effect. It produces it as the condition of its symbolic existence, while at the same time presenting it as though it had found it intact. The same holds for all the rest.

The term does not present itself as an invasion but as a fifth column. It is an intimate enemy, not a frontal assault. It is born within the critical tradition, speaks its language, cites its fathers and mothers, knows its reflexes. That is precisely why it can indict that tradition. And that is why its indictment cuts where others merely point. It operates like a blade in half-light, scalpel or straight razor, an instrument that makes itself known only after it has already opened the wound. What seemed mimetic, one more word in the series of centrism, was the missing cut. What seemed a docile name turns out to be the most uncomfortable in the lineage, because it does not denounce this or that center; it denounces the operation by which a center comes to constitute itself as such. And in doing so it removes from the table any possibility of continuing to speak of legitimate centers. Every centrality, after exclucentrism, is marked by the outside that sustains it and has learned to disavow. This is not a demand for accountability. It is the acknowledgment that the innocence of the center is no longer tenable.

II. Methodological Note: Exposed Constellations

Exlucentrism does not proceed by subsumption into a school, nor does it claim filiation to any single critical tradition. This renunciation is neither eclecticism nor indecision but an internal requirement of the very phenomenon described. If the operation the manifesto denounces consists in the production of centers through exclusions, then thinking exlucentrism from within a single school would itself already be an exclu-centric gesture of the second order, since it would consecrate an epistemological center in the very movement that claims to criticize the production of centers. The coherence between method and object is not a formal elegance of the manifesto; it is the only position from which the conceptual apparatus can sustain itself without contradicting itself. Every strict fidelity to a single school, however critical that school may be, reproduces in miniature the logic that exlucentrism has come to dismantle.

The method the manifesto adopts can be named, without inaugural pretension but with precision, as exposed constellations. Constellations, in the plural, because no single conceptual figure exhausts the phenomenon and each problem demands its own configuration of voices. Exposed, because the fundamental operation of the method consists in making visible the articulations the center needs to keep in shadow, drawing the threads out into the light, showing what the fiction of innocence takes care to erase. The word deliberately carries its three resonances: the astronomical one of the night sky that yields only to the patient eye; the photographic one of the duration during which an image inscribes itself on its support; and the polemical one of the act of exposing as denunciation. All three operate simultaneously, because exlucentrism requires sustained observation, durable inscription, and public disclosure of the mechanism it describes. Confronted with the center that conceals, the method that thinks it is built upon the inverse gesture: that of rendering visible.

This constellation rests on three formal supports, each contributing a distinct and non-hierarchizable function. From Walter Benjamin comes the intuition that truth does not emerge from systematic deduction but from configuration, from the way certain elements placed in relation illuminate each other and produce a meaning that none of them could have generated separately. From Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui comes the logic of the *ch'ixi*, the productive juxtaposition of elements that neither synthesize nor reconcile into a higher unity, that epistemology which holds the tension without dissolving it and explicitly rejects the Hegelian *mestizaje* as a false solution. From Édouard Glissant comes archipelagic thought: the form of thinking in relation rather than in system, where ideas connect like islands and do not subsume themselves like continents, where the whole does not foreclose the parts. Three voices, three geographies, three centuries, no common school among them. Their coexistence in this note neither fuses nor hierarchizes them; it places them in constellation. And

from that constellation, without reducing itself to any of them, exclucentrism raises its own conceptual universe. The manifesto is neither Benjaminian nor Cusicanquian nor Glissantian; it is exclu-centric. But without those three lights, the night from which the apparatus observes the machinery of the center would be unreadable.

III. Constellation of Predecessors

First Nucleus: Constitutive Exteriority

A certain philosophical tradition of the twentieth century suspected, before many others, that solid identities lived off an outside of which they almost never spoke. Jacques Derrida formulated this with deconstructive precision by showing that apparently self-sufficient concepts, presence, reason, civilization, identity, rested on hierarchical oppositions in which the dominant term needed the subordinate in order to be what it was. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe extended this intuition into the political domain and named it the constitutive outside: that border through which every collective identity closes itself against something that defines it negatively. There is in these formulations a lucidity that exclucentrism gratefully receives, because without that first logical operation the rest of the apparatus would be impossible. But there is also a ceiling that ought to be named. The constitutive outside, as this tradition formulates it, operates at the level of discourse, of the sign, of symbolic antagonism. It has no bodies. It has no seas, no deserts, no fences. It lacks the affective temperature of the one who trusted the center and was cast aside by it. Exclucentrism receives the intuition and carries it to the place where deconstruction was unwilling to descend: that of matter, of geography, of the concrete affective economies that sustain and are sustained by that exteriority. What in Derrida was a trace and in Laclau was an articulation becomes in exclucentrism a Mediterranean border, a Darién jungle, a detention center, a wound that bleeds, and a subject who loves and hates the one who promised belonging. The extension does not contradict deconstruction; it obliges it to touch ground.

Second Nucleus: Coloniality and the Zone of Non-Being

Another constellation, larger in scope and closer in lineage, named the truth that European philosophy preferred to keep in shadow. Frantz Fanon was the first to state, without mitigation, that there exists a zone of non-being, a symbolic territory where certain subjects are not treated as full human beings but as ontological surplus, and that this zone is not a historical residue but an active product of the modern colonial machinery. Aníbal Quijano named that machinery with the expression coloniality of power and showed that modernity and coloniality are not parallel processes

but two faces of the same gesture: one cannot exist without the other. Enrique Dussel insisted on the category of exteriority to name those whom modern totality leaves outside its own account. Walter Dignolo developed from there an entire epistemology of border thinking. This tradition is probably the one most proximate to exclucentrism, and that should be stated plainly. Without Fanon there would be no ontological operation possible; without Quijano there would be no way to understand the center as historical product rather than natural location. Exclucentrism receives this inheritance and, at the same time, marks two extensions that the decolonial tradition does not always carry out. The first: that the exclu-centric operation is not reducible to the modern colonial matrix, it also operates in geographies the Global South considers its own, within postcolonial states, within subaltern communities themselves, in hierarchies of race, gender, class, and language that the decolonial discourse sometimes overlooks by concentrating on the colonial axis. The second: that exclucentrism adds to the denunciation of coloniality the question of the affective economy of the phenomenon, the seduction, the ode, the guilt of the one who departed, and the guilt of the center, dimensions that the decolonial tradition names but rarely develops as a system. Exclucentrism extends the zone of non-being until it coincides with the entire map of modernity, and equips it with an affective apparatus of which Fanon opened the door and which remains to be fully deployed.

Third Nucleus: Biopolitics, Necropolitics, and Grievable Lives

A third tradition concerned itself with the most visible and at the same time most limited task: describing how power manages the life and death of populations that have already been classified. Michel Foucault showed that modernity invented increasingly sophisticated apparatuses for administering populations, normalizing conduct, and regulating bodies. Achille Mbembe carried the intuition to its darkest consequence by naming necropolitics, that differential administration of death by which certain bodies are protected while others are systematically exposed to annihilation. Judith Butler thought through which lives are considered grievable and which disappear without generating collective mourning. Giorgio Agamben described the state of exception and the figure of homo sacer: bare life that can be eliminated without its elimination constituting a crime. All four contributions are indispensable, and exclucentrism draws on them to describe the material consequences of the phenomenon it denounces. But there is a shared blind spot that must be named with clarity. All of these theories take as their starting point the hierarchical classification of populations, the fact that lives amenable to administration, killable lives, grievable lives, and bare lives already exist. None of them systematically interrogates the prior moment in which that classification is produced: the founding gesture by which certain lives are placed in each category. Biopolitics administers what is already hierarchized; necropolitics decides who dies among those already devalued; distributed mourning recognizes those who were already recognizable. Exclucentrism situates itself logically prior

to all of this, at the moment when hierarchization is executed, in the first operation by which certain bodies are produced as administrable and others as expendable. This is not a correction of Foucault, Mbembe, Butler, and Agamben. It is a question they did not formulate because they took it as answered, and one that exclucentrism retrieves in order to show that without that question the rest of the edifice floats on an unexamined ground.

Fourth Nucleus: Wasted Lives and the Border Wound

There are names that the academy is slow to accept and that said first what the great traditions took decades to articulate. Zygmunt Bauman, a Polish sociologist with a keen ear for what progress refused to name, argued in his later works that liquid modernity does not generate human waste accidentally but by functional necessity, that wasted lives are a systemic product of a global order that must constantly discard in order to reproduce itself. The formulation is close to exclucentrism and deserves generous acknowledgment. But Bauman thinks from within a sociology that maintains a certain descriptive coldness and rarely descends to the affective body of the discarded person: to the dream that drove the peripheral subject to the place of disposal, to the silent ode that precedes the wound. Gloria Anzaldúa did what Bauman did not do, and she did it first. In the opening pages of *Borderlands* she wrote that the border is an open wound where the third world grates against the first and bleeds, and from that image she raised an entire poetics and politics of the border as existential territory, not merely geopolitical. Exclucentrism receives this image and must acknowledge it honestly: the border as open wound is her formulation before it is anyone else's, and this manifesto inherits it without disguising the debt. But it also extends it. Anzaldúa speaks from the Tijuana-Matamoros border, from the Chicana experience, from a situated experience that exclucentrism respects and does not presume to replace. What the manifesto does is ask whether that image, born at a precise point on the map, can sustain a broader diagnosis of the operation that every center executes against every edge, in the Mediterranean, in the Darién, in the Andaman Sea, in the Sonoran Desert. Exclucentrism answers yes: the border wound is not a metaphor exclusive to one territory but a general structure of the phenomenon, and generalizing it is not a betrayal of Anzaldúa but a carrying of her work to its widest consequence. Bauman contributes the structural diagnosis without affect. Anzaldúa contributes the affective image without systematic generalization. Exclucentrism articulates both: adding temperature to structure, and generalization to image.

Fifth Nucleus: The Silenced Voice and Failed Recognition

A final constellation addressed what none of the foregoing had fully named: the dimension that runs from the subaltern's silence through the dispossessed person's fury to the broken promise of recognition. Gayatri Spivak asked whether the subaltern can speak and showed that the most

sophisticated critical operation does not consist in giving the subaltern a voice, a gesture always paternalistic, but in recognizing the epistemic structures that produce her silence. Peter Sloterdijk, from a very different shore and with all the political reservations that must attend him, analyzed how the rage of the dispossessed accumulates historically as an affective capital that no system can ignore indefinitely. Axel Honneth thought failed recognition as the structural motor of social conflicts: that frustration of the one who expected to be recognized as a full subject and was treated as an object. And as a contemporary interlocutor, rather than a structural predecessor, Slavoj Žižek deserves mention, on the European migration phenomenon and on the moral economy of liberal pity he has said things that no other contemporary voice has said with equal acuity. These four voices illuminate zones that exclucentrism requires, and what each contributes should be acknowledged. But it is equally necessary to say what none of them articulates, which is precisely the affective heart of the manifesto: the double guilt. Spivak names the epistemic silence but not the guilt of the one who trusted and departed. Sloterdijk names accumulated rage but not the secret shame that rage conceals. Honneth names failed recognition but not the collective liturgy of innocence by which the center processes its own guilt for having failed the recognition it promised. Žižek comes closest of all to the sentimental fiction of the center, but does not articulate it as a system, he denounces it in polemical fragments without deploying it as a complete affective economy. Exclucentrism receives these four lights and places them in constellation in order to name what none of them alone could name: the simultaneous articulation of seduction, ode, wound, the guilt of the one who departed, and the sentimental catharsis of the center. That articulation is the manifesto's own contribution, and it is legible only against the background of those who came before.

IV. The Promised Dream and Shared Guilt

Exclucentrism does not operate in cold blood. Before the cut there is a seduction, and before the seduction there is a horizon. The center does not merely produce margins; it also offers a luminance, a promise, an invitation. Call it the social contract, citizenship, modernity, progress, European integration, the American Dream, the democratic republic, the free market, the dignified life, the future. Every center constructs its own symbolic horizon and projects it toward the margins as though it were a gift. The peripheral subject is not addressed first as an excluded person but as a possible guest. This seduction is the system's first affective operation, and without understanding it, nothing of what follows can be understood. Because the cut that exclucentrism describes is not made on foreign bodies but on bodies that have been previously summoned. The cruelty of the phenomenon lies not in the center's indifference to the peripheral subject. It lies in the fact that the

center first calls him, names him, offers him a place at a table whose plate will always be empty for him.

To the center's seduction the peripheral subject responds with what ought to be named a Promethean ode. This is not passive acceptance of the promise. It is active song, desire, march, project. The one who departs toward the offered dream is not dragged there against his will; he walks. He crosses deserts, seas, borders, languages, bereavements. He sells what he owns, mortgages those he loves, leaves behind everything he was in order to wager on what he will become. The ode is the silent hymn of that wager, the conviction that the offered horizon is worth the price of the road. And that conviction makes the peripheral subject a co-participant in his own deception, not a victim in the full sense, because the absolute victim is a comfortable figure for the center: easy to assist, easy to photograph, easy to include in campaigns that afterward change nothing. The exclu-centric subject is more uncomfortable than the absolute victim precisely because he had agency, chose, sang. That choice does not attenuate the cruelty of the system; it complicates it. Because it obliges us to think of the excluded as a full subject before, during, and after the cut, not as a suffering body that exists only when the center decides to look at him. This is the affective asymmetry that exclucentrism describes and that no prior theory of exclusion had placed in its proper position. The excluded person is not merely the one who is outside. He is the one who wanted to enter, who believed he deserved to enter, who learned the language of the center in order to enter, and whose door was slammed in his face after it had been left visibly open.

This is why the wound that opens when the promise breaks is not an ordinary wound. It is intimate. The center is not, for the peripheral subject, a remote stranger but a close seducer, a symbolic father, a lover, a host who offered wine and house and in the end drew a blade across the trusting throat. And from this arises the irreconcilable duality that traverses the entire subjectivity of the excluded. Hatred, because the betrayal is real and its effects are material: hunger, border, prison, deportation, death. Love, because the promised horizon continues to shine even after being known as false, because the dream does not deactivate once broken, because the center continues to be the place where the peripheral subject learned to desire. This duality does not resolve. It is not a contradiction that the subject can work through and transcend. It is the constitutive scar of exclucentrism on the body of the one who trusted. One loves and hates the same center, flees from it and turns toward it, curses it and imitates it, denounces it and sings it to one's children as a still-desirable horizon. And that oscillation has a physical cost that pure affect theory tends to forget. It exhausts. It erodes. It ages. It produces hypertensive bodies, chronic insomnia, nameless depressions. The intimate wound of the excluded is not only psychic; it is somatic. It inscribes itself in the flesh with the same slowness with which the system denies having produced it. Slavoj Žižek has insisted that the two dominant public

positions on the migratory phenomenon, the xenophobic and the humanitarianist, share the same fundamental error: treating the refugee as an external problem rather than as a structural symptom of the West. That intuition should be extended. Both positions share another error as well: that of not looking at the intimate wound of the one who trusted, because doing so would oblige an admission that the center was once desirable and remains so even for those who denounce it.

Accompanying this intimate wound is a secret guilt that is rarely named and that must be brought to light. The one who marched toward the promised dream carries a silent shame for having believed. Shame for having been seduced. Shame for having abandoned those who remained at the origin: parents, siblings, the hometown, the landscape, the mother tongue. Shame for having desired what the center offered while knowing, in some corner of awareness, that the offer was suspect. Shame, finally, for having chosen to walk toward the deception and not having seen it in time. This guilt of the one who departed is one of the most silenced affects of the exclu-centric condition, and it rarely appears in discourses on migration or exclusion, because acknowledging it discomfits both the excluded, who prefers to narrate himself as a pure victim, and the center, which prefers to narrate the excluded as alien from the very beginning. But the guilt is there, and it works from within, and it produces effects: silence, shame before children born in the new territory, objectless melancholy, impossible loyalties, the permanent sensation of never being whole in any place. Exlucentrism, taken seriously, must be able to name this without converting it into individual pathology or migrant folklore. It is the affective trace of a structural operation, and as such it forms part of the phenomenon described.

But the system does not produce guilt only in the peripheral subject. It produces it also, with the same intensity, though by other paths, in the center itself. And here lies one of the blind spots of the critical tradition that must be illuminated. The center does not exclude with a clear conscience. It knows, at some level, what it is doing. It knows that the promise it offers will not be fulfilled, that the border kills, that the social contract always has an outside, that civilization rests on waste. And precisely because it knows this, it needs to produce a sophisticated repertoire of devices for managing that guilt without altering the structure that generates it. This repertoire deserves to be called, without euphemism, the sentimental fiction of innocence. It is the machinery by which the center converts its structural guilt into administered pity: humanitarian aid, corporate philanthropy, development cooperation, NGOs, donations, awareness campaigns, moving reportages, tolerance narratives, rights declarations that are signed in order not to be applied. This entire compassionate architecture is not built against exclusion. It is built to make exclusion habitable for the one who produces it. It is the center's catharsis, not the peripheral subject's reparation. Here Žižek has been especially lucid in insisting that charity does not contradict exploitation but perfects it, because it allows the extractive

mechanism to remain intact while a reparatory image is constructed. The Western liberal subject needs the figure of the refugee to confirm his own goodness, and that is why he prefers to assist the refugee rather than abolish the conditions that produce him. But it is necessary to go further than Žižek on this point. The sentimental fiction does not operate merely as the hypocrisy of the privileged. It operates as the affective economy of the entire center, as the collective liturgy of innocence. It allows the privileged to look in the mirror and see themselves as compassionate rather than complicit, as generous rather than extractive, as open rather than exclusionary. And the most perverse aspect of this operation is that pity itself becomes an additional mechanism of exclusion, because it constructs the peripheral subject as an eternal object of aid and never as a full subject, needs him needy, wants him grateful, prefers him suffering rather than equal.

And since every fiction sustained on a real contradiction eventually fractures, the effects of this guilt-management are cumulative and predictable. Proclaimed tolerance collides, sooner or later, with the cultural, ethical, and legislative substrate of the group that excludes, because that substrate was historically built on the presumption of an outside that tolerance now demands be integrated. The contradiction does not resolve; it explodes. And in exploding it releases affects the center had kept encapsulated beneath the language of pity: contempt that becomes xenophobia, suspicion that becomes legal persecution, denial of difference that becomes biologicistic racism, that old machinery which hierarchizes populations ontologically and which the center believed it had left behind. And in the best case, when none of these raw affects is unleashed, what remains is pity: the sentiment that the center confuses with virtue and that is merely the gentle form of hierarchy, the daily confirmation that the other is less, that his existence depends on the generosity of the one who looks down from above. Exclucentrism thus describes not only how exclusion is produced but how the center itself manages its guilt for producing it, and how that management ends up becoming another level of the phenomenon, more sophisticated and often crueler, because it operates under the garb of goodness.

The entire operation is sustained by affects, not only by structures. There is a seduction that calls, an ode that marches, a wound that discovers the betrayal, a guilt of the one who trusted sinking in silence, a guilt of the center that recycles itself as pity and ends up feeding the machinery. And if the critical theory has taken so long to name it, it is because looking at it directly obliges an admission that no enlightened subject wishes to make: that the center does not only exploit the peripheral subject but needs to love him in its own way, needs to pity him, needs to keep promising him, needs to constantly produce the fiction that one day the promise will be fulfilled, in order to keep being a center without facing the guilt of never having fulfilled it. The center's innocence is not only a public image; it is a collective psychic necessity. That is why it is so difficult to dismantle. And that is why

exclucentrism, when it names it, produces not indignation but discomfort, which is always the first sign that something real has been touched.

V. The Three Vectorial Operations

Up to this point the manifesto has described the postulate, declared its method, traced its constellation of predecessors, and deployed the affective dimension of the phenomenon. What remains is to name the concrete mechanics of exclucentrism, the specific operations through which the center fabricates its peripheries and, in the same gesture, erases the traces of the fabrication. These operations are three, and it is apt to call them vectorial because they are not mere static descriptions but directions of force applied to bodies, spaces, and times. The first operates on the ontological plane and precedes the other two logically, though not chronologically. The second operates on the regime of visibility and knowledge, ensuring that the mechanism remains opaque both for the one who suffers it and for the one who executes it. The third operates on geography and time, producing zones of suspension where the peripheral body is trapped in a threshold that leads nowhere. The three sustain each other, and none functions fully without the others. But the first has logical priority and must be established with clarity, because there lies the distinction that separates exclucentrism from any prior theory of population administration.

First Operation: Ontological

The first operation is ontological, and consists in the prior assignment of degrees of humanity to bodies before the system decides what to do with them. This should be stated without mitigation so that the distinction is established once and for all. Biopolitics describes how power administers the life of populations; necropolitics describes how power distributes death differentially; the theory of distributed mourning describes which lives are recognized as grievable and which disappear without generating shock. All of these theories take as their point of departure a datum they leave unexamined: the fact that administrable lives, killable lives, grievable lives, and their negatives already exist. The ontological operation of exclucentrism situates itself precisely in that prior moment. Before the body enters any biopolitical or necropolitical apparatus, it has already been classified within an ontological hierarchy that decides how much it counts as a subject, how much it can expect to be recognized, how much its death weighs on the collective conscience. That classification is not a cultural prejudice or a historical residue; it is an active operation of the center over its peripheries, sustained and constantly updated. It is executed before the border, before the law, before the camp. It is executed every time a public discourse, a press headline, an administrative decision, an image, a

silence assigns a body its presumed degree of humanity. And precisely because it operates so early and so invisibly, everything that is afterwards done to that body will appear to be the natural consequence of what that body is, when in reality it is the active consequence of the hierarchization the system carried out before the body entered the field of vision. Without the ontological operation, neither Foucault nor Mbembe nor Butler nor Agamben nor Bauman has an object to work with. But none of them names it as a first operation, and that is why exclucentrism needs to plant its flag here with the greatest possible clarity. The ontological hierarchization of lives is not the system's presupposition; it is its first active work, and upon its success everything else depends.

Second Operation: Invisibilization of the Frame

The second operation is the invisibilization of the frame, and consists in erasing the traces of the fabrication of the margin. Once ontological hierarchization has been produced, the system needs that production to appear as discovery rather than as act. The margin must not present itself as the result of a sustained operation but as a pre-existing datum that the center simply finds, registers, and manages. That is why the invisibilization of the frame operates not only on the content of the narrative but on the frame of the narrative itself, on the conditions that make it possible for certain things to be said while others remain unthinkable. What the system produces, it presents as a finding. What is the consequence of specific power relations, it presents as nature, as culture, as incapacity intrinsic to the marginalized, as a historical accident without an author. The operation functions on multiple simultaneous planes. On the discursive plane, it produces narratives in which the excluded appear without the history that produced them, as though their current condition were a starting point and not a result. On the visual plane, it produces images that show the excluded person as a datum rather than a product, photography that aestheticizes suffering without naming the subject who caused it, documentary that gathers testimony without reconstructing the chains of responsibility that led to the testimony. On the epistemic plane, it produces categories that classify peripheries without interrogating who classifies them and under what interests, statistics that count the dead without counting those who decided those deaths were permissible. On the legal plane, it produces norms that regulate exclusion as though it were a management problem rather than a designed consequence. And across all planes, what is invisibilized is the same thing: the productive frame, that is, the machinery that decides what enters the field of the visible, the nameable, the administrable, and what remains outside that field. It should be noted that the invisibilization of the frame is not exterior to the subject who suffers it. The body that has been ontologically hierarchized and lives under the invisibilization of the frame ends up internalizing the operation, comes to see itself as a datum rather than a product, as a problem rather than a symptom, as an anomalous exception rather than the obligatory result of the machinery that fabricated it. That internalization is one of the

most durable effects of exclucentrism and one of the most difficult to reverse, because it requires not only changing discourses but restoring to the subject the consciousness of his own historical production.

Third Operation: Liminal Suspension

The third operation is liminal suspension, and consists in the fabrication of spatial and temporal zones where the peripheral body is trapped in a threshold that leads nowhere. This operation takes up the territorial dimension referred to in earlier drafts as spatial and extends it decisively by incorporating time. The center does not only produce borders as devices of geographic containment; it also produces waits as devices of temporal containment, and both dimensions sustain each other in an operation that must be named precisely. Liminal suspension is the threshold of abandonment: a place and a time where the body remains pending, touching no ground, reaching no destination. Classical anthropology described liminality as the transitory moment in a rite of passage, the phase in which the subject ceases to be what it was in order to become what it will be. The liminal suspension of exclucentrism is liminality without reincorporation, a completed ritual without recognized transformation, a passage that never arrives. To maintain it, the system deploys three mechanisms operating simultaneously. The first is bureaucratic: papers that are lost, windows that do not respond, missing stamps, postponed appointments, files that sleep in archives until they become incomprehensible even to those charged with resolving them. The second is technological: opaque databases that register the body without allowing the body access to its own record, biometric systems that convert identity into code while simultaneously disappearing the subject into the archive, algorithms that classify without explanation and decide without a human interlocutor to appeal to. The third is legal ambiguity: the suspended body's legal status, neither admitted nor rejected, neither a full rights-holder nor completely outside the law, an indeterminacy the center has no need to resolve, because indeterminacy itself is already the specific form of control. These three mechanisms produce a non-place, in the most exact sense of the term: spaces and times that do not fully appear on any cartography or any agenda, gray zones of the global order where the peripheral body lives without officially existing. And here lies the observation that must be planted with its full force. These non-places are sometimes inaccessible even to the center itself. The system does not fully know how many bodies are in them, where they are, under what conditions. This productive ignorance is not a failure of the system; it is a specific function of exclucentrism. The center needs these zones to be unreadable in order to deny them. If they were readable, the center would have to answer for them. Their unreadability, to the center itself, is the condition of possibility for the center to keep presenting itself as innocent. What the center does not know about the body it has produced is precisely what allows it not to answer for that body. That ignorance does not exonerate; on the contrary, it is the system's

active work upon itself in order not to know. And in that zone where no one fully knows, neither the subject who suffers nor the system that produces, liminal suspension extends indefinitely, consuming life without killing, aging without acknowledging, and preparing the ground for the final wound, when it arrives, to be experienced as a bitter mystery: a cut that surprises a body that had trusted in the liturgy of waiting.

The three operations sustain each other. The ontological operation decides which bodies count for less before they enter the field of vision. The invisibilization of the frame ensures that this decision appears as a finding rather than an act. The liminal suspension materializes the result in spatial and temporal zones where the peripheral body lives without existing, until the final cut inscribes upon it the wound that the manifesto will name in the following section. Without all three together, exclucentrism would not function. And together they explain why the phenomenon is so resistant to critique: because any intervention targeting only one of the operations, without touching the other two, leaves intact the machinery that sustains all of them.

VI. The Multiple of Epistemic Disobedience

Modern scientism organizes the production of knowledge through an operation it rarely names as such: the division of intellectual labor. Each discipline its object, each method its field, each product its validation circuit, each author his niche. That division is not neutral. It is the specific form by which the epistemological center protects its monopoly over what deserves to be called legitimate knowledge and over what is relegated to expression, opinion, intuition, or art. Disciplinary fragmentation is not an accident of growing complexity but an active device of exclusion, another of exclucentrism's machineries operating at the very heart of the institution that claims to critique it. That is why thinking exclucentrism from within a single discipline would be, once again, an exclucentric gesture of the second order: the consecration of an epistemological center in the very movement that claims to dismantle the production of centers. The phenomenon the manifesto describes is multiple by necessity; it operates simultaneously in the ontological, the affective, the territorial, the memorial, the aesthetic, and the legal registers, and no single discipline can reach it without amputating it. Thinking exclucentrism demands a figure that is structurally suspect to the modern disciplinary division, a figure the system does not know where to place, one that refuses to be distributed.

That figure exists, and must be carefully distinguished from another with which it is often confused. The tradition of modern art produced what might be called the thinking artist, a classical figure of the

twentieth century, present in very different lineages and very diverse geographies: artists who reflected on their practice or on the world and produced work charged with thought. But the thinking artist's thought operated within the language of art and for the field of art, dialoguing with philosophy and theory from the position of an intelligent receiver, not a producer of legitimate knowledge in other fields. The research artist is a more recent and rarer figure. He not only thinks; he investigates systematically an object that exceeds the artistic field, deploying his own methodologies in dialogue on equal terms with anthropology, history, philosophy, forensic geography, and political theory, and returning his findings in a format that remains artistic but operates as the production of legitimate knowledge beyond the museum. The difference is not of degree but of nature. The thinking artist thinks the world from art. The research artist produces knowledge about the world using the means of art as epistemic tools, not as a final destination. And in that step, what appeared to be artistic practice is revealed as a method of investigation irreducible to academic prose, because there are zones of the exclu-centric phenomenon that can only be inscribed through visual, spatial, archival, and corporeal operations that no paper can reach.

The figure that emerges from this can be named the multiple of epistemic disobedience. Multiple, because its subjective unity is itself the product of the multiplication of knowledges and practices the system keeps separate, not an originary identity but a sustained operation. It is an artist who is a researcher who is a curator who is a writer who is an essayist who is an archivist who is a witness who is an agent of articulation between communities. Not through dispersion but through the necessity of the object, because exclucentrism as here thought cannot be touched any other way. And epistemic disobedience because the figure does not ask permission from scientism to produce truth about the phenomenon; it does not submit to the hierarchy of evidence that the academic center privileges; it does not accept that only the peer-reviewed paper can be called knowledge. The disobedience is not affective noise or adolescent posturing; it is a conscious methodological operation that takes up the term where the decolonial tradition left it and extends it into the terrain of making, of producing objects and spaces that the system does not recognize as knowledge and that nonetheless inscribe a truth about the phenomenon that no discipline alone could reach. The multiple of epistemic disobedience is an insurgent figure without needing to proclaim itself as such, and its mere existence already produces a displacement in the field of whoever decides what counts as knowledge and what does not. This figure is, moreover, coherent with the method of exposed constellations declared earlier. Constellations are multiple figures: several points of light that signify something only when read in relation. The multiple is, in subjective terms, what the constellation is in methodological terms. Who thinks exclucentrism and how they think it are reflected in the same operation.

To this figure corresponds a second critical function that must be named without mitigation: the hacking of academic extractivism. There is a silent operation by which the university and cultural criticism gather subaltern experiences, border sorrows, and testimonies from vulnerable communities, process them in the academy's own language, publish them in journals inaccessible to the experiential subject, accumulate symbolic capital from that material, and return nothing to the territory from which they extracted. That operation is extractivism, a word that should be used with its full weight, because the logic it describes is structurally the same as that of mining or agro-industrial extractivism: to empty a territory of its value and leave behind the residue. Academic extractivism is the intellectual form of excludentrism, its mode of processing human peripheries by converting them into citable literature. The multiple of epistemic disobedience operates against this logic by structure, not by declaration. It does not produce only papers or only sellable objects but devices of encounter, spaces of real material and symbolic return toward the communities involved, genuine articulations between agents the system keeps separate. Its product is not completed in the academic validation circuit or in the art market but in the possibility of something returning to the extracted territory. This does not mean the figure is free of all extractive contradiction, no work about others' suffering is entirely clean, but it does mean that it operates with active awareness of that contradiction and constructs its practice to minimize it, not to conceal it.

And accompanying the denunciation of academic extractivism comes another that goes necessarily with it: the combat against the aestheticism of pain and its commercialization. The field of contemporary art has developed in recent decades a sophisticated market of others' suffering: humanitarian photography that wins international prizes, installations that monetize refugee bodies converted into consumable image, documentaries that transform forced displacement into a prized cultural product, biennials that collect tragedies of the Global South to sustain their prestige. All this apparatus operates under the language of commitment and denunciation, but executes exactly the operation it claims to combat, converting pain into aestheticized merchandise and the body of the excluded into raw material for a circuit that needs him suffering in order to valorize him. The multiple of epistemic disobedience works against this by method, not by slogan. Its visual and curatorial practice chooses subtraction over hypervisibility, void over the pornography of the corpse, archive over spectacularization. It renders disappearance visible by refusing to simulate the presence of the disappeared. It inscribes the violence of the system through operations of absence, not through the exploitation of the wounded body. And in that gesture, which is simultaneously aesthetic and ethical, it finds one of the few possible ways to speak of others' pain without selling it. This is the coherence between figure and axiom. The multiple of epistemic disobedience does not need to justify

its Axiom of Aesthetic Subtraction afterward because that axiom is already constitutive of its mode of operating.

From this figure, and only from it, can the operative axioms the manifesto will deploy in what follows be derived with legitimacy. Without this prior declaration, the axioms would be abstract philosophical program. With it, they are a code of praxis for a situated figure that already exists in the expanded field of contemporary art and that claims its place not as a decorative exception but as a methodological insurrection against the dominant forms of producing knowledge about exlucentrism and about everything exlucentrism describes.

VII. The Fractal Wound

The preceding section closed by announcing that the final cut, when it arrives after the liturgy of waiting, inscribes itself on the body as a bitter mystery, a surprise visited on the one who had trusted in the mechanics of the threshold. That image marks the precise moment at which the three vectorial operations condense onto a concrete surface: the place and the body where exlucentrism ceases to be an abstract mechanism and becomes flesh, geography, biography. That place bears a classical name that deserves to be recovered with the generosity owed to whoever named it first: the border. Gloria Anzaldúa wrote that the border is an open wound where the third world grates against the first and bleeds, and from that image she raised an entire poetics and politics of the edge as existential territory. Exlucentrism inherits that image without disguising the debt, but carries it to its wider consequence, because what Anzaldúa formulated in a precise geography, the manifesto needs to think as the general structure of the phenomenon across all geographies where the center produces its material peripheries: the Central Mediterranean border, the Darién between Colombia and Panama, the Sonoran Desert, the Andaman Sea, the English Channel, the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Each of these territories is a surface on which the exclu-centric wound inscribes itself with its own signature, but all share the same operation. The center fabricates the edge in order to keep the flesh open, and in that gesture it executes on the peripheral body the cut that the rest of the conceptual apparatus had been preparing.

But here the manifesto needs to say something that the tradition of border thought has not said with sufficient clarity, and which constitutes the central turn of this section. The exclu-centric wound does not stop at the geopolitical border. It is a mobile and cumulative pathology: it travels with the body, stows itself in the luggage, crosses to the other side, and reinstalls itself in each new sphere of the life of the one who crossed. It is not an illness that is suffered at a moment and resolved. It is a condition that

displaces and reproduces itself at ever more intimate scales as the body moves through the interior of the center. To name it precisely, it is useful to borrow a mathematical figure and invest it with conceptual weight. The exclu-centric wound has a fractal geometry. A fractal is a structure in which each part reproduces the form of the whole at a different scale, and in which self-similarity operates at every possible scale. Applied to the phenomenon the manifesto describes, this means that the geopolitical border is only the first visible scale of a structure that reproduces itself inward indefinitely. When the body crosses, the pathology does not disappear; it reproduces at a smaller scale in the neighborhood where it is housed, in the precarious work it obtains, in the language it stumbles over, in the classroom where it is watched, in the medical consultation where it is seen in haste, in the administrative office where its name is misspelled time and again. And within each of those scales, the operation reproduces at still a smaller scale: in the employer's gaze, in the distance of colleagues, in the correction of the accent, in the suspicion of the police officer requesting documentation, in the half-inattention of the doctor who does not quite listen, in the silence that follows each word spoken with the wrong accent. The fractal unfolds indefinitely inward, multiplying the wound rather than closing it. And what this geometry is at its most exact level deserves to be named. It is not merely the fractal geometry of the wound; it is the fractal geometry of violence. Each scale of the fractal is an active act of the system upon the peripheral body, not the memory of a prior violence or the metaphor of a larger one. The everyday discrimination, the glass ceiling, the accent correction, the routine suspicion, the interminable form. None of these scenes is a residue of the primary operation; all are contemporary exercises of exclucentrism upon the body that has already crossed.

And here lies the cruelest turn of the diagnosis. Before crossing, the wound was visible. It had a name, protagonists, intermittent media coverage, intermittent outrage. The boat that capsizes, the desert that devours, the wall that stops, the fence that tears. These are the wounds the center consumes as news and which public opinion processes through the compassionate liturgy the manifesto already named in the affective section. But when the body manages to cross and enters the interior of the center, the wound mutates. It ceases to be visible and becomes invisibility. It ceases to have a name and becomes oblivion. The body now inside ceases to interest as news because it no longer figures the border drama, it has become one more of the many lives administered in the center's internal order. And precisely for that reason its suffering becomes more efficient for the system, because it no longer needs to be managed through sentimental catharsis or visible philanthropy. It is sufficient for it to be invisible. Sufficient that that body dilute itself in the suburbs, in precarious employment, in saturated hospitals, in files no one reviews, in shared apartments where life grows small. Invisibility and oblivion are the most efficient form of exclucentrism because they demand from the center not even the gesture of pity. They demand only not looking. And that not-looking is the center's active work, not

an absence of action. It is a sustained decision to keep outside the field of public visibility what continues to occur within its own cities. The sentimental fiction of innocence already described operates selectively on the first scale of the fractal, the visible border, and disengages entirely from all subsequent scales. That selectivity is functional to the system because it allows the center to feel compassionate regarding the first scale and completely indifferent regarding all the others.

And here, at this point, the manifesto must state what is probably the most important political conclusion of its entire course. If the geometry is fractal and violence reproduces at every scale, then peaceful assimilation is not a promise the system has yet to fulfill. It is a structural impossibility of the system. The center cannot assimilate because its very constitution as a center depends on there being peripheries at every scale, not only geographical ones. If it assimilated completely, it would cease to be a center. The peaceful inclusion that liberal discourse promises again and again is not unfulfilled for lack of political will, insufficient resources, or ineptitude in implementing the right policies. It is unfulfilled because the system that promises it needs it to remain unfulfilled in order to continue being what it is. This means that every new integration program, every new declaration of tolerance, every new diversity campaign, performs a paradoxical function that must be named without mitigation: it sustains the illusion that the promise might still be fulfilled, while operating to ensure it never is. The promise is not betrayed in each particular case through insufficient application. The promise is structurally unkeepable because the system that enunciates it depends on its permanent non-fulfillment. And under this regime, the peripheral subject who crossed becomes what must be named with full precision: a chronic border-carrier. Chronic, because the condition installs itself and does not heal, is managed across decades but not eradicated. Carrier, because the body carries the border within itself and transports it to places where the border was not drawn on the map. The migrant, the refugee, the racialized person, the subaltern does not cross the border leaving it behind, he puts it inside himself and transports it into the center. And the center recognizes that border in every interaction where the body appears: in every form asking for origin, in every gesture that marks the difference, in every decision that activates it. The border ceases to be geographical and becomes corporeal, but remains the same border operating under the same regime.

And here it is worth planting what is probably the most perverse gesture of the phenomenon. The system does not merely tolerate the presence of the chronic carrier; it needs him. It houses him in its interior precisely because his presence allows the center to keep producing peripheries within its own entrails. The center is not infiltrated by the carrier; it cultivates him. The fractal structure of the active wound is the mode by which the center reproduces itself as center inward, not only outward. Without chronic border-carriers living within the center, the center would lose the internal peripheries it needs in order to continue distinguishing itself. The geopolitical border outside and the

fractal border inside are the same operation at different scales, and both are functional to the same regime. And from this operation follows what the peripheral body experiences as the perpetual sabotage of its right to belong. The belonging promised by the system is structurally sabotaged by the system itself. It is not that the excluded fails to belong because he is slow, lacks resources, or has not tried hard enough. It is that the system actively sabotages his belonging, at every new scale of the fractal, so that the promise remains a promise and never becomes a reality. The sabotage is not exceptional; it is the central operation of exlucentrism applied to bodies already inside. And the sabotage is perpetual because each generation reproduces the operation on the next. The children of the migrant inherit the parent's border transformed into another scale, not as memory but as active condition. That is why exlucentrism does not resolve with time; it transmits with it. And that is why part of the wound always remains, not in the state of a closed scar but in a state of necrosis, tissue that does not heal entirely, that dies in silence within the body that learned to live with it, that becomes part of the body while simultaneously working against it, a sustained reminder that the primary cut never healed because the geometry that produced it remains active at every subsequent scale.

And here, in this final movement, the manifesto can formulate the complete closure of its conceptual apparatus before proceeding to the axioms. Exlucentrism is not a phenomenon with a locatable beginning and end. It is not an operation executed once and leaving the peripheral body to its own devices. It is a fractal and mobile structure that reproduces without rest, mutates its forms while preserving its nature, follows the body wherever the body goes, lodges within the center precisely in order to reproduce itself from within, and transmits itself between generations as an inherited condition. Under this regime, the border is not a place; it is an operation. The wound is not an event; it is a geometry. And the excluded is not someone who is outside, he is someone who carries within himself the very line that decides what is inside and what is outside, in every space he inhabits and in every time he lives. While the chronic carrier drags his fractal pathology and sinks into the functional invisibility of the center, the center deploys its compassionate liturgy on the first visible scale of the fractal and ignores completely all the replications reproducing within its own cities. The center's self-congratulation and the peripheral subject's fractal wound are the two faces of the same regime. One is exhibited as goodness; the other necrotizes in silence. And between them exlucentrism sustains itself, renews itself, reproduces itself. This is the geometry of violence under which we live, and naming it in all its extension is the minimum condition for any subsequent critical praxis to have any meaning at all.

VIII. The Mediterranean Laboratory

Everything said up to this point would require, at some moment, a descent to a concrete scenario where the conceptual apparatus could be verified without being reduced to illustration. This requirement is not minor, because without empirical anchoring the manifesto risks operating in an abstraction that the very phenomenon described refutes, since exlucentrism is not a philosophical category floating above the world but a mechanics that occurs in places and upon bodies. Among the many possible scenarios, the Central Mediterranean offers probably the sharpest and most obscene verification of the apparatus. There, in the stretch of sea separating the North African coasts from the Sicilian and Maltese shores, the fractal geometry of violence inscribes itself with a clarity that no theory could have imagined before encountering it in the facts. The Mediterranean laboratory, named so not by metaphor but with exact precision, is the place where the European center rehearses, refines, and normalizes the operations of exlucentrism in full view of everyone. And it is apt to call it a laboratory, because what is done there does not remain there, it is exported as a model to other borders of the global order, replicated with local variations in the English Channel, in the Aegean, on Balkan routes, and becomes a technical reference for any center that needs to manage its peripheries with efficiency. The Central Mediterranean is not an exception or an anomaly within the European regime; it is its condensed synthesis and its permanent exhibition. What occurs there does not contradict the values Europe proclaims; it completes them, because Europe could not sustain its self-image without the machinery that sea puts into operation every day.

At the scale the manifesto called the visible border, the Mediterranean laboratory operates through a sophisticated architecture of externalization and calculated omission. Europe does not execute violence directly upon bodies; it has learned that direct execution charges the executor politically with a reputational cost difficult to manage. It therefore delegates violence to third parties: finances and equips the misnamed Libyan Coast Guard to intercept vessels in international waters and return them to detention centers where torture and trafficking are documented, sustains agreements with North African governments that convert those countries into external gendarmes of the center, pays for violence to be exercised in its name and at the same time far from its view. The operation is remarkably sophisticated because it allows the center to proclaim respect for human rights while subcontracting their violation to regimes that the same center considers, in other contexts, unacceptable. To this delegation is added the progressive withdrawal of European rescue operations: first the dismantling of Mare Nostrum, then the sustained reduction of Frontex's rescue capabilities, converting the sea into a non-human weapon whose lethality requires no identifiable executor. Water does not sign acts, has no face, and does not appear before tribunals. Europe knows this. That is why

it converts maritime space into a cemetery without needing to declare itself a murderer. The inversion of the frame is perfect. What is a deliberate operation of the center appears as natural tragedy; what is a political decision presents itself as geographical fate; what is a systemic product is narrated as the consequence of people-smuggling mafias, to whom all responsibility is attributed while the European legal system, with its Dublin Regulation and its selective visas, continues producing the structural impossibility of migrating through regular channels, which is precisely what makes the maritime route inevitable. The invisibilization of the frame described earlier finds here its most efficient realization, because the waters of the Mediterranean Sea are themselves already a device of erasure: they swallow bodies without trace, disperse remains, neutralize witnesses, execute disappearance without requiring any active gesture from the center. It demands only not rescuing, not searching, not counting.

At the scale the manifesto called liminal suspension applied to territory, the Mediterranean laboratory deploys an operation that goes beyond what prior theories of borders had described, and which must be named with precision because it adds a nuance to the conceptual apparatus. Liminal suspension does not operate only on peripheral bodies; it also operates on the witnesses who attempt to document or suture the wound. The maritime rescue organizations that have gone out to operate in the Central Mediterranean over the past decade have been systematically subjected to the same type of administrative time-management as the migrants themselves. Their ships are detained in distant ports designated by European governments for weeks or months, subjected to administrative blockades that are renewed indefinitely, sanctioned with million-euro fines under accusations of complicity with people trafficking, their crews criminally investigated, their communications intercepted, their routes conditioned by political decisions made in distant capitals. The Italian dispersal strategy, which obliges ships to disembark those rescued at remote ports and requires humanitarian vessels to make journeys of several days between each operation, is probably the most cynical formulation of this operation, because it converts the time of rescue into administratively sequestered time, ensuring that during these forced crossings other bodies drown at sea with no one able to assist them. The operation is elegant in its perversity. The center has no need to prohibit rescue; it suffices to make it slow. It has no need to criminalize solidarity; it suffices to bureaucratize it to exhaustion. And in doing so it extends liminal suspension to a second layer of subjects, the witnesses, ensuring that while these are trapped in port, the sea remains blind and the wound bleeds without possible documentation. This is one of the points where the Mediterranean laboratory adds something to the conceptual apparatus: it reveals that excludentrism does not operate only on the excluded but also on those who attempt to make the operation visible. Those who attempt to suture the wound are treated as threats and subjected to more sophisticated versions of the same machinery suffered by those they

attempt to assist. Organized solidarity is criminalized precisely because it interrupts the invisibilization operation the center needs to sustain its self-image.

At the scale the manifesto called interior invisibility, the Mediterranean laboratory performs its most prolonged and, in a certain sense, most cruel work. The bodies the sea does not swallow, those who manage to reach Lampedusa, Sicily, the Andalusian coasts, Malta, do not find the end of the wound but its mutation. They are received in hotspots, identification and registration centers where the subject who has survived an atrocious crossing is immediately stripped of his name and reduced to a file number, subjected to classification procedures that decide in hours whether his life trajectory fits the category of refugee or will be catalogued as an economic migrant, a classification that operates as a sentence of expulsion without need of trial. The narrative exclusion is executed here with full violence. The subject has no right to tell his story; his testimony is processed at administrative speed by overloaded interviewers who have minutes to decide the fate of the person before them, and any hesitation, any omission, any inconsistency arising from recent trauma is interpreted as a lack of credibility. The ontological operation the manifesto described as the prior hierarchization of lives materializes here in administrative categories the system presents as technical and neutral but which are the direct execution of the prior decision about how much each life counts. And for those the sea did swallow, the Mediterranean laboratory reserves the most definitive operation of the regime: memorial exclusion. Bodies recovered by fishing boats, by the Italian coast guard, by merchant vessels assisting in the open sea, are frequently buried in mass graves without identification, without systematic DNA-matching protocols with families in countries of origin, without headstones bearing names, without the possibility of mourning for those waiting on the other side of the sea. Families are thus condemned to a perpetual and unresolved grief: without a body to mourn, without a grave to visit, without a death certificate that would officialize the loss, without even access to knowledge of whether their son, their brother, their father is dead or still disappeared somewhere along the route. The forced disappearance that in the twentieth century was associated with specific military dictatorships has become in the Central Mediterranean a European democratic policy, executed with the same indifference and the same result: thousands of unnamed bodies and thousands of families without the structural possibility of closing the wound. And here lies the closure of the laboratory, the point where excludentrism verifies its most extreme logic. The disappearance is not an accident of the migratory phenomenon; it is an operation. It allows the center to maintain the ambiguous figure, to deny responsibility through the impossibility of attribution, to allow each new shipwreck to be processed as a tragedy without author rather than as the consequence of a specific legal system. The indeterminacy is functional, and that is why the system has no need to resolve it.

And here, before closing the case, it is necessary to name two specific operations of the Mediterranean laboratory that rarely appear in analyses of borders and that, without which, everything prior would be impossible. The first may be called induced fiscal complicity, and designates the mechanism by which the inhabitants of the European center finance, through the obligatory fiscal system, the operations of violence the center executes on its peripheries, without having given explicit consent to that financing and without having access to transparent information about the precise destination of the funds they contribute. Frontex is financed with European budgets drawn from the pocket of every taxpayer; the agreements with the misnamed Libyan Coast Guard are sustained with public money collected from populations who would probably not approve its allocation if they were clearly consulted about the documented results of its use. The hotspots, detention centers, biometric control and deportation systems, all of this operates with funds that every inhabitant of the center contributes with no real option of refusal. The complicity exists even if induced, because the operation is executed and the funds are transferred. And the most sophisticated aspect of the device is precisely its delegated character: the citizen of the center signs no document authorizing the violence, participates in no specific decision on migration policies, is not informed in detail about what his contribution finances, yet is at the same time the structural ultimate financier of the entire system. That zone of absent consent combined with forced participation is where contemporary excludentrism finds its most efficient form, because it produces structural accomplices without needing to ask them to recognize themselves as such.

But the device is still more perverse than what has been stated so far, and must be planted without mitigation because it is the cruelest observation of the contemporary diagnosis. Induced fiscal complicity does not operate only on the citizen of the center understood as the native European or full legal resident. It also operates, with the same technical efficiency, on the body of the excluded who has managed to enter, and on his descendants. The modern fiscal system does not finance itself only through direct taxes on declared income; it finances itself fundamentally through indirect taxes on consumption, of which VAT is the most universal and most invisible, a levy blind to the legal status of whoever pays. It does not ask whether the purchaser is a national citizen, a legal resident, a refugee in process, undocumented, or employed informally. It taxes only the act of purchase. And the act of purchase is unavoidable for any body that needs to eat, dress, be transported, communicate, survive. From this follows a consequence that public discourse rarely names. Every time the excluded who has managed to enter the center buys bread at the supermarket, pays rent for a room, tops up a mobile phone, replaces a gas canister, acquires medicine, clothes his children, he is financing with every euro of indirect tax the machinery that excluded him, continues excluding him now at more subtle internal scales, and will continue excluding his descendants. The operation is perfect in its

perversity because it does not even require the subject to work formally, to make contributions, to declare income. It is sufficient for him to live. The very act of material survival within the center's territory converts the excluded person into a structural financier of the exclucentrism he suffers. And here the extreme case deserves mention: the undocumented worker in the informal economy, without papers, without contract, without registered administrative presence, the subject that official discourse presents as a parasite benefiting from welfare without contributing anything, a narrative that is one of the rhetorical pillars of contemporary economic xenophobia. The reality is exactly the opposite. The informal worker pays indirect taxes in every purchase and every service he consumes, financing the state machinery that pursues him as illegal while tolerating and needing his labor as cheap manpower. And simultaneously he has no full access to the public services he finances: he cannot register his residence normally, cannot access universal healthcare safely, cannot report labor abuses without risk of deportation. He is the silent financier of a system that denies him. The classical formula that underpins the legitimacy of democratic taxation is here inverted with a cruelty that liberal thought has never been willing to name. Taxation without representation is exactly the condition of the excluded within the center, and that taxation finances the machinery that sustains his exclusion. And this operation is inherited. The children of the migrant, the subsequent generations born within the center and carrying the inherited fractal wound, continue to be fiscally active subjects like any other inhabitant. Through VAT and through all indirect taxation, they finance, generation after generation, the same machinery that continues excluding them at more subtle scales. Induced fiscal complicity is not an accident of the economic system; it is a specific operation of exclucentrism in its contemporary phase, a device of self-sufficient financing in which the peripheral body pays for the machinery that excludes him, and in paying for it sustains it, and in sustaining it guarantees his continued exclusion. It is a *perpetuum mobile* whose fuel is the material survival itself of the one who suffers the operation. And the fractal geometry of violence adds here a dimension not previously named. The fractal operates not only toward the body of the excluded who crosses and drags the border with him; it also operates toward the body of the citizen of the center converted into an induced financier, and operates with particular cruelty on the body of the excluded himself and his descendants, trapped in a dual operation in which they are simultaneously victims of the exclu-centric regime and forced financiers of its perpetuation.

The second operation the Mediterranean laboratory requires in order to function can be called the narcosis of welfare, and designates the set of combined forces that keep the majority of the center's population in a state of functional unconsciousness regarding the machinery their fiscal contribution sustains. These forces are multiple and operate simultaneously, so they must be named precisely to avoid reduction to a single explanation. The first is the sustained obsession with preserving a welfare

society that operates more as a defensive fiction than as a daily reality, a narrative inherited from the postwar period that promised material stability in exchange for acceptance of the political order and that in practice is being dismantled at increasing speed. People maintain mentally the idea of welfare while watching it come apart in their own experience: basic rights eroded, housing inaccessible, public healthcare saturated, education deteriorating, inflation devouring stagnant wages, future pensions uncertain. But the fiction continues operating because abandoning it would require confronting the question of what lies beneath, and the answer is difficult to process for a subjectivity already at the limit of its management capacity. The second force is material precarization, which produces a specific political effect: the consumption of people's cognitive and affective energy in the sheer survival of the day-to-day. Whoever dedicates all their hours to making it to the end of the month lacks the real availability to investigate where their taxes go, to articulate sustained political critique, to participate in organized forms of opposition. Precarization is depoliticization through exhaustion, and this is functional to the system, which needs tired citizens, not informed ones. The third force is entertainment as a saturation device, occupying the mental space that precarity leaves free: platforms, social networks, rapid news cycles that substitute analysis for intermittent and short-lived outrage. Critique, when it appears, lasts the duration of a headline and dissolves before it can organize itself. This is what deserves to be named with an exact word: the sequestration of critique. The center no longer needs to prohibit opposition; it suffices to saturate it, to disperse it, to decompose it into a thousand micro-outrages that never accumulate into structured confrontation. And these three forces combine with induced fiscal complicity to produce the compound effect the Mediterranean laboratory requires: a politically neutralized political subject, capable at most of passing outrage but incapable of sustained opposition. While that neutralization holds, the laboratory operates with tranquility: boats sink, bodies disappear, families are left without mourning, and the center maintains its self-image intact. The narcosis of welfare is not an accident of contemporary culture or a collateral effect of late capitalism; it is a specific operation of exclucentrism in its current phase, an active device of political neutralization that the system needs so that its border machinery can continue functioning without mass opposition. And from this follows a consequence that must be planted before closing the section. Awakening from this machinery is not an individual decision free of consequences; it is a painful and sustained process that confronts the citizen with his own structural complicity, with the practical uselessness of much of the available critical tools, with the dispersal of possible opposition, and with the difficulty of articulating effective political action within a system designed to neutralize it. That awakening is not the reward of analysis; it is a burden to be carried. And precisely because it is a burden, it cannot be declared a superior condition compared to those who remain narcotized, because the narcosis is actively produced by the system and is not the individual moral responsibility of those who suffer it.

What the Mediterranean laboratory demonstrates, after three decades of documented operation and more than thirty thousand counted deaths, and a number probably much greater of unrecorded deaths, is that peaceful inclusion is not an unfulfilled promise of the European regime but a structural impossibility already named in the preceding section. Europe does not organize the integration of its southern peripheries; it rigorously organizes the conditions under which those peripheries will drown before arriving, will be deported if they arrive, will remain in administrative suspension if not deported, and will continue as chronic border-carriers if they finally access the territory. The Mediterranean laboratory is not a deviation from European values; it is their operative synthesis. And here it is necessary to return to the caution the manifesto has sustained throughout. Naming Europe as the specific executor of exclucentrism in this case does not mean reducing the phenomenon to a European operation; it means recognizing that in the Central Mediterranean the general regime of exclucentrism finds its most documented and most exportable contemporary realization. Other centers, in other geographies, execute analogous operations with local variations: the Mexico-United States border, the Darién Desert, the Andaman Sea, the enclaves of Southeast Asia. What the Mediterranean laboratory adds to the conceptual apparatus is the verification that exclucentrism is no longer a philosophical hypothesis requiring future demonstration; it is a documented contemporary operation whose description requires only that the facts be accepted. And with the facts accepted, what remains is to respond to the question the manifesto cannot avoid formulating in its final section: what to do with a diagnosis of this gravity. That question is answered by the axioms that follow, not as an exhaustive response but as an operative proposal for a critical praxis that knows itself to be insufficient and yet refuses inaction.

IX. Methodological Axioms of Exclucentrism

Everything the manifesto has deployed up to this point, the canonical postulate, the method of exposed constellations, the constellation of predecessors, the promised dream and shared guilt, the three vectorial operations, the place of enunciation of the multiple of epistemic disobedience, the fractal wound, and the Mediterranean laboratory, leads inevitably to the operative question the manifesto cannot evade in its final stretch: what to do with a diagnosis of this gravity. The answer cannot be a closed program, because any closed program would reproduce in its very form the logic of the center it claims to criticize. But neither can it be silence, because silence in the face of exclucentrism is already passive complicity with its perpetuation. What follows are six methodological axioms formulated as a code of praxis for the multiple of epistemic disobedience, obligatory operative principles governing both visual and plastic production and curatorial practice and the public

articulation of exlucentrism. They are not suggestions or recommendations; they are conditions of internal coherence without which any intervention reproduces, at some level, the machinery it claims to combat. And it should be announced from the outset that the sixth axiom articulates the preceding five, because exclu-centric praxis is not executed by applying one or another principle in isolation but by activating all six simultaneously at different scales.

Axiom I: Principle of Focal Inversion

The gaze is directed at the center, not at the peripheral subject.

Artistic and curatorial research under the regime of exlucentrism does not fix its attention on the peripheral subject as an object of study, an analytical fetish, or a passive victim whose exposure serves to move the spectator of the center. It fixes its attention on the productive matrix of exlucentrism: on the legal, architectural, aesthetic, bureaucratic, fiscal, mediatic, and discursive gears that actively fabricate the periphery to sustain the center. Investigating the excluded is academic or artistic extractivism, depending on the operative discipline, and reproduces the center's operation of needing the peripheral subject converted into a consumable object. Investigating the excluding apparatus is the operative deconstruction of the machinery, and restores to the peripheral subject his condition as a full subject by displacing the focus from his suffering toward the structural causes that produce it. The praxis of the multiple of epistemic disobedience dissects, evidences, and dismantles the mechanisms of the center: exposes its devices, illuminates its zones of calculated opacity, translates into visual and spatial language the operations the center needs to keep invisible. The exclu-centered subject does not appear in the work as exposed pain but, when he appears, as agency, as an articulated critical voice, as a presence the device facilitates but does not capture. And when the work concerns the peripheral body, it does so under the strict rule of the following axiom.

Axiom II: Principle of Aesthetic Subtraction

Render the void visible rather than simulating the presence of the disappeared, and work against the rapid pace of cultural consumption.

Confronted with forced disappearance, the ontological hierarchization of lives, the ambiguous figure of bodies swallowed by the liquid cemeteries and exclu-centric deserts, the visual and curatorial representation of the multiple of epistemic disobedience does not resort to morbid hypervisibility, does not aestheticize the corpse, does not convert the wounded body into material available for the center's emotional consumption. The violence of the system is enunciated through absence, through the dense void that remains in the place where the body was erased, through water without anyone, the border without a human figure, the empty hall, the sustained silence in the exact place where a cry

was expected. The work operates as an index of the subtraction, as the negative trace of what is no longer there, not as a simulation of the disappeared person's presence, which would itself already be another form of erasure through substitution. And to the spatial subtraction is added the temporal subtraction, because the rapid pace of contemporary cultural consumption is one of the specific devices of the narcosis of welfare and operates by reducing any sustained attention to passing outrage. Exclu-centric praxis works against that pace. It demands time for detention, delays the reading, forces the spectator to remain, articulates its interventions in durations that normal cultural consumption does not tolerate. The subtraction is thus double: of the represented suffering body and of the accelerated time of its consumption, and in that double negation the work opens the space for something beyond affective pornography to inscribe itself in the spectator's consciousness.

Axiom III: Rejection of Compassionate Catharsis and Confrontation with Complicity

The artistic space does not operate as a balm for the center's guilt; it operates as a confrontation of its structural complicity.

The artistic and curatorial space under the regime of exclucentrism does not function as a multicultural balm in which the center symbolically integrates the periphery in order to cleanse its historical guilt, nor as a device of sentimental catharsis in which the spectator of the center processes his guilty conscience through a brief shock and an outrage articulated in hours and dissolved in days. The sentimental fiction of innocence already described in the affective section of the manifesto operates through a compassionate liturgy that contemporary artistic space has learned to produce with growing sophistication, and which exclu-centric praxis must reject without exception. Any project under this framework rejects the traditional formats of institutional benevolence, and when an institution hosts the project, demands that the expository device evidence or dismantle the exclusionary logics of that same institution: its collections, its colonial or national archives, its funding sources, its internal hierarchies, its relations with specific economic and political powers. And to the confrontation with the institution is added a deeper confrontation: that of the public with its own structural fiscal complicity. Exclu-centric praxis names and makes visible that every spectator of the center is an induced financier of the machinery that produces the peripheries visible in the work, that every inhabitant of the territory, citizen or not, contributes via direct or indirect taxes to the sustaining of the regime, and that the narcosis of welfare is not an accident of contemporary culture but a specific device that keeps that complicity operative. The expository space thereby becomes a place the spectator cannot leave intact, because in it he finds not the confirmation of his own goodness but the evidence of his structural participation. This confrontation is not moralization; it is the restitution of information about the functioning of the system. And without this confrontation,

any exclu-centric intervention risks operating as another sophisticated form of the compassionate catharsis the manifesto has been dismantling.

Axiom IV: Principle of Spatial Resignification and Activation of the Counter-Archive

The space where the work is executed carries political and semantic weight that dialogues with the critical operation.

The praxis of the multiple of epistemic disobedience operates on the awareness that the space where the work is inscribed is not neutral. The museum's white cube, that hegemonic format of contemporary art, is already in itself a device of the center: a place designed to neutralize the political charge of works by decontextualizing them and converting them into consumable aesthetic patrimony. Breaking that neutralization is a constitutive operation of exclu-centric praxis, and it is executed through two complementary paths the axiom authorizes. The first path is the displacement of works toward spaces with latent traumatic memory, places where unresolved historical past fertilizes and gives material coordinates to the tragedy of the present, and where the temporal clash between what occurred there and what is now exhibited there activates a counter-archive that no neutral space could produce. Shelters, mass graves, ruins, prisons, abandoned hospitals, former institutions of control. These spaces function as containers where the temporality of exclucentrism becomes readable, because present pain finds in them its historical anchor. The second path, equally valid, is the critical appropriation of apparently neutral, banal, functional, or everyday spaces and their resignification through artistic and curatorial intervention. An airport waiting room, a bank branch, a supermarket, a shopping mall, an administrative office, an urban roundabout. None of these spaces carries evident traumatic memory, but all are settings where exclucentrism executes specific operations that can be rendered visible through the semantic estrangement the intervention produces. Resignification thus operates through two paths: temporal clash between past and present, or critical displacement of the space's habitual meaning, and both are legitimate within exclu-centric praxis. What the axiom prohibits is operation in neutral spaces that are not resignified, because spatial neutrality without critical intervention reproduces the white cube's operation and neutralizes the power of the work.

Axiom V: Principle of Social Utility and Epistemic Restitution

The practice culminates in genuine return toward communities, networks, and agents involved, not in the aesthetic closure of the project.

The expository space is not an end in itself, nor an aesthetic cemetery, nor a mausoleum of distant pain. It is a living political forum and a device of articulation between agents the system keeps

separate. The praxis of the multiple of epistemic disobedience culminates obligatorily in a genuine return toward the communities, networks, and agents implicated in the worked phenomenon, and this return operates under two strict criteria the axiom specifies. The first criterion is that the recipient of the return is not reduced to a specific typology. They may be rescue or historical memory associations, but also university chairs and research institutes working in related lines, other artists, writers, and researchers articulating networks of critical collaboration, communities structured by religious practices that sustain real networks of reception and sustenance, humanitarian organizations providing concrete material aid to exclu-centered bodies. What matters is not the type of organization but the nature of the relation, which must be one of genuine material or symbolic return and not of asymmetric extraction. The second criterion is that exclu-centric praxis does not operate under the logic of integration, because the manifesto has demonstrated that peaceful integration is structurally impossible under the current regime. It operates under the logic of subsistence, understood in its broadest sense: aid to materially sustain the life of exclu-centered bodies, articulation of networks that allow resistance to the center's operations, transfer of resources the system retains, generation of conditions for collective mourning to be articulated and for testimonies to find spaces of inscription where they are not extracted. Art does not save bodies from the sea, does not unearth graves, does not halt deportations, does not repeal immigration laws. But it generates the autonomous space where those who do those things can recognize each other and articulate themselves, and where those who suffer them can find the minimal possibility of a mourning and a continuity. That is the specific social utility of exclucentrism, modest in scope but precise in function, and without it, any exclu-centric intervention ends up becoming another form of symbolic capital accumulated by the multiple of epistemic disobedience at the cost of the communities from which it extracts its material.

Axiom VI: Principle of Multi-Scalar Operation

No intervention operates in isolation at a single scale of the fractal, because any action reduced to one scale leaves the others intact.

The fractal geometry of violence described in the section on the fractal wound demonstrates that exclucentrism reproduces itself simultaneously at distinct scales, from the geopolitical border to the intimate border of the excluded body inhabiting the center, passing through all the intermediate scales of liminal suspension, administrative invisibility, everyday discrimination, and the generational inheritance of the wound. Any exclu-centric intervention operating on only one of these scales, however rigorous, leaves the others intact and ends up being absorbed by the machinery that reproduces the operation on the untouched planes. That is why the praxis of the multiple of epistemic disobedience operates multi-scalarally or does not operate at all. The work that denounces

the liquid cemetery of the Central Mediterranean without simultaneously naming the interior operation that continues upon the body of those who managed to cross leaves the system intact at its interior scale. The curatorial intervention that confronts the spectator with fiscal complicity without articulating material return toward concrete communities leaves the system intact at its practical scale. The critical praxis that operates only within the artistic institution without articulating work with grassroots organizations leaves the system intact at its social scale. And so on across all possible combinations. The multi-scalar operation therefore requires that each exclu-centric project simultaneously activate at least three dimensions of work. An analytical and critical dimension that operates on the discursive apparatus, in the work itself and in its associated texts. An expository and communicative dimension that operates on public consciousness through visual and curatorial devices. And a material articulation dimension that operates on the concrete networks of subsistence, restitution, and collective mourning. Without all three dimensions simultaneously active, the intervention reproduces in its own fragmented form the fractal logic it claims to combat. And this final axiom articulates the preceding five, because each of them operates at a specific scale of critical work, and only in their simultaneous activation do they acquire their full meaning. Focal inversion operates on the analytical plane. Aesthetic subtraction operates on the visual and temporal plane. Confrontation with complicity operates on the spectator's consciousness. Spatial resignification operates on the expository device. Epistemic restitution operates on the material articulation. The six axioms are not a list but a system, and their joint reading is the minimum condition for exclucentrism to pass from diagnosis to praxis.

With these six axioms the conceptual and methodological apparatus of exclucentrism is sealed, not as a closed decree but as an operative code that the multiple of epistemic disobedience adopts as the condition of the internal coherence of its work. The manifesto does not aspire to constitute doctrine or a closed program. It aspires to offer a language and a method with which to think and operate upon a phenomenon whose gravity demands both conceptual rigor and sustained material commitment. What has been named throughout these pages, the center that constitutes itself by producing peripheries, the three vectorial operations of the system, the affective dimension of the promised dream and the double guilt, the fractal geometry of violence, the Mediterranean laboratory as its most documented contemporary realization, the induced fiscal complicity and the narcosis of welfare, does not constitute an exhaustive inventory of a phenomenon whose scope exceeds any possible formulation. It constitutes a critical opening from which subsequent work, the work of many voices and many practices, can continue. Exclucentrism does not close with this manifesto. It opens with it. And the axioms that end here are the point from which the critical praxis of the multiple of epistemic disobedience can begin its sustained work, knowing that it is insufficient work

and that it is nevertheless necessary, that it is modest in scope and that it is nevertheless legitimate, and that it is executed not in the name of a privileged knowledge but from a situated position conscious of its own limits. The center will continue producing its peripheries. The machinery will go on operating. But it will no longer be able to do so under the presumption of its own innocence, because there are those who have learned to name it, and naming it is, in this regime, the prior condition of any critical action possible.

X. Bibliography

The bibliography that follows is organized by thematic nuclei, in coherence with the method of exposed constellations declared at the opening of the manifesto. Each nucleus groups the voices the conceptual apparatus works in some of its dimensions, and the internal order of each nucleus follows alphabetical criterion by surname. Where a canonical edition in Spanish exists, it is indicated as the principal reference, and the original title and year of first publication in the original language are noted in parentheses. The works included do not constitute an exhaustive list but an effective selection, that is, those the manifesto engages with conceptual weight or designates as a close horizon of dialogue.

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